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ABSTRACT
The hypothesis of selective exposure assumes that people seek out
information that supports their views and eschew information that
conflicts with their beliefs, and that has negative consequences on
our society. Few researchers have recently found counter evidence
of selective exposure in social media: users are exposed to politi-
cally diverse articles. No work has looked at what happens after ex-
posure, particularly how individuals react to such exposure, though.
Users might well be exposed to diverse articles but share only the
partisan ones. To test this, we study partisan sharing on Facebook:
the tendency for users to predominantly share like-minded news ar-
ticles and avoid conflicting ones. We verified four main hypotheses.
That is, whether partisan sharing: 1) exists at all; 2) changes across
individuals (e.g., depending on their interest in politics); 3) changes
over time (e.g., around elections); and 4) changes depending on
perceived importance of topics. We indeed find strong evidence for
partisan sharing. To test whether it has any consequence in the real
world, we built a web application for BBC viewers of a popular po-
litical program, resulting in a controlled experiment involving more
than 70 individuals. Based on what they share and on survey data,
we find that partisan sharing has negative consequences: distorted
perception of reality. However, we do also find positive aspects of
partisan sharing: it is associated with people who are more knowl-
edgeable about politics and engage more with it as they are more
likely to vote in the general elections.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and behavioral sciences
General Terms
Experimentation, Measurement
Keywords
Facebook; Twitter; Social media; Online social network; Politics;
Selective exposure; Partisan sharing; News aggregators
1. INTRODUCTION
The media landscape affords people the opportunity to control which
political messages they consume. With freedom of choice comes
responsibility, especially that of having a balanced news diet. Un-
fortunately, the opposite of a balanced diet – selective exposure – is
likely to happen when consuming news. The theory of selective ex-
posure holds that people tend to seek out political information con-
firming their beliefs and avoid challenging information. With a mix
of experiments, surveys, and content analysis, decades of research
have proved its existence across a variety of media – in newspapers,
magazines, (cable) TV, radio, and online news sites [16,17,21,36].
Selective exposure is thought to be highly problematic for democ-
racy – for example, it is often associated with “echo chambers” [37],
whereby citizens befriend only like-minded others and do not talk
to anyone else, resulting in segregated and polarized communities.
Computer scientists have proposed different news aggregators that
encourage politically diverse news consumption and try to mitigate
the effect of selective exposure [11, 18, 24, 28, 29].
The problem is that, based on previous work, we do not know
what happens after exposure – how individuals react to it. Peo-
ple might be exposed to diverse articles but share only the partisan
ones. Social media offers us a unique opportunity to study how peo-
ple react upon exposure. We thus go beyond selective exposure and
study partisan sharing in an unobtrusive way and in large-scale: the
tendency for users to predominantly share (not only be exposed to)
like-minded news articles and avoid conflicting ones.
Political scientists have been focusing on building a “theory” of
news consumption and they have done so upon either self-reported
data of media consumption (and self-reporting can be inaccurate
and error-laden [32, 41]), media selection data (often generated
from small-scale experiments) or actual data of media exposure,
which does not necessarily translate into consumption – one might
well be exposed to a TV show without paying too much attention.
Computer scientists, on the other hand, have been studying on-
line news consumption for a while now [23,25,29]. Individuals are
increasingly turning to social networking sites to read and share
political news, especially on Twitter and Facebook [2, 31]. Re-
searchers have been able to get hold of data on those sites and un-
obtrusively analyze sharing patterns of a large number of users dur-
ing long periods of time. They have produced reliable data-driven
analyses of sharing behavior without, however, focusing on the the-
oretical side. That is why hypothesis driven analyses, so common
in political science, represent the next natural step for social media
research.
To this end, we formulate a set of hypotheses from the political
science literature (Figure 1), analyze data from Facebook (44,999
news articles from 37 popular US news sites and 12,495 Facebook
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user profiles) and gather evidence for or against partisan sharing.
In so doing, we make the following main contributions:
• We derive a set of well-grounded and coherent hypotheses
related to partisan sharing in social media from the litera-
ture in political science (Section 3). These hypotheses are
about whether or not partisan sharing exists in social media;
changes across individuals; changes over time; and impacts
on society by being associated with specific people’s politi-
cal attitudes.
• We gather a representative US sample of Facebook users
(Section 4) and test some of those hypotheses with that data
(Section 5). We investigate the news media sources individ-
uals share and we find that partisan sharing exists. Based on
a measure of partisanship we will define, only 33% of US
Facebook news readers in our test sample can be considered
moderate. Contrary to what the literature has posited, espe-
cially among conservatives, partisan sharing applies only to
political news and disappears for non-political news (e.g., en-
tertainment). We find that those who are partisan tend to be
interested in politics. We have also been able to study how
partisanship changes over time: we found that partisanship
among Facebook users within a US state tends to be stable,
and changes only during primary elections to then go back to
the original value.
• Since Facebook data allows us to test most of the hypothe-
ses but not all, we build a political site that recruits UK BBC
viewers on Twitter and allows them to express their opinions
about a weekly BBC political debate called Question Time
(Section 6). Since Twitter differs from Facebook, we con-
sider the hypotheses we have already tested on Facebook and
find that they equally hold on the Twitter data. After this va-
lidity check, we test three new hypotheses regarding societal
aspects of partisan sharing. We firstly find that people per-
ceive a news outlet to be politically biased depending on their
own political leanings (regardless of the objective bias) – the
farther their leaning from the outlet’s, the more biased they
perceive the outlet to be. This results in partisan individuals
having a distorted perception of how biased news outlets are.
However, partisanship has a positive aspect too. We indeed
find that the more partisan individuals, the more politically
knowledgeable they are (second hypothesis), and the more
likely to participate to political life (e.g., to vote).
We brought data to bear on the phenomenon of partisan shar-
ing. Contrary to popular belief, social media have done little to
broaden political discourse. Despite the political diversity social
media have brought into one’s news diet [2], individual news shar-
ing has not been changed much contrary to traditional media. On
one hand, social media users share news that matches their polit-
ical beliefs and, as a result, may become increasingly divided; on
the other hand, partisan sharing may encourage participation and
news posting on social media sites. To mitigate the effect of parti-
san sharing, one might think of new ways of making sharing a bit
less partisan and a bit more serendipitous, and this work offers an
experimental basis for such future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Selective exposure. By analyzing news consumption on a vari-
ety of media (which included TV, radio, magazines, newspapers,
online), Stroud [36] concluded that people tend to preferentially
Figure 1: Factors and Consequences of Partisan Sharing.
choose, read, and enjoy partisan news. A large body of literature
shows supportive evidence for her findings [9,16,17,21,27]. More
recently, some researchers have reported situations in which selec-
tive exposure is lower than expected or totally missing. LaCour did
not find any evidence for it in the TV and radio consumption of
920 individuals in Chicago and New York [19]; Shapiro found an
extremely low level of it online [13]; and An et al. even found that
Twitter friends expand one’s diversity of political news [2].
However, despite its breadth, such a work and, for that matter,
similar others suffer from the data under study: self-reported (and,
as such, error-prone) data of news consumption. Starting from this
criticism, LaCour directly measured how 920 individuals from New
York and Chicago have been exposed to news for 85 days [19].
These measurements were taken by cell phones that recorded par-
ticipants’ audio. He showed that self-reported data grossly overes-
timates exposure. It turns out that most people do not care much
about politics and are thus on a meager news diet – consequently,
it does not really matter whether that diet is balanced or not. The
problem is that audio-recording cell phones report what people are
exposed to but not necessarily what they are paying attention to. A
similar problem applies to An et al.’s work [2]. The authors ana-
lyzed Twitter streams and found that Twitter friends greatly expand
one’s diversity of political news. However, it is not possible to
quantify the extent to which a Twitter user is actually paying atten-
tion to his/her own stream.
Why it matters. Selective exposure is often considered a threat
to political and societal life. That is because it might influence
people’s beliefs in whom they should vote for [26, 42]. It also en-
courages intolerance of dissent and results into ideological segre-
gation [3,14]. Adamic et al. [1] showed that the political discourse
on the blogsphere is not only partisan but also highly-polarized.
The same pattern (i.e., polarized communities) has been observed
in social media when looking at: usage of political hashtag [7] and
a distribution of tweets different stories receive [39]. Political se-
lective exposure also influences opinion formation on matters that
have little to do with politics [36]. However, selective exposure is
not always bad. It is also associated with political participation and
political knowledge (i.e., factual information about politics) [36]:
the more one is exposed, the more one is interested in politics and
is knowledgeable about it.
What to do. Computer scientists have proposed different news
aggregating systems that encourage politically diverse news con-
sumption. For example, BLEWS [11] and NewsCube [29] gather
and visualize news articles on the same subject matter but with dif-
ferent political leanings, making people aware of the existence of
media bias. Munson and Resnick have studied how different pre-
sentation techniques make politically diverse news articles more
Hypothesis Facebook Twitter
Dynamics
[H1] Existence 3 3
[H2.1] Political leaning 3 3
[H2.2] Amount of news shared 3 3
[H3] Changes over time 3
[H4] Perceived importance 3
Societal consequences
[H5.1] Perceived bias 3
[H5.2] Political knowledge 3
[H5.3] Voting probability 3
Table 1: List of Hypotheses. 3indicates the hypothesis tested
with Facebook/Twitter data.
appealing than others. It turns out that making hostile news more
appealing is quite challenging [24].
Considering the literature, we conclude that no work has studied
one of the results of (selective) exposure: what people do after be-
ing exposed. Unlike traditional experiments, social media sites of-
fers us a unique opportunity to observe sharing for a long period
of time in unobtrusive ways. We set out to explore partisan shar-
ing in the context of Facebook and Twitter, and we firstly do so by
connecting sharing behavior to factors of selective exposure.
3. PARTISAN SHARING
To begin with, we define partisan sharing as the tendency for users
to predominantly share like-minded news articles and avoid con-
flicting ones.1 Then, we derive five main hypotheses which were
related to selective exposure in the literature and we now related to
partisan sharing. That is, whether partisan sharing: 1) exists at all;
2) changes across individuals (i.e., depending on their interest in
politics); 3) changes over time (i.e., around elections); 4) depends
on perceived importance of topic; and 5) has any consequence in
the real world (i.e., whether people vote or not).
Existence of partisan sharing. Its existence has been hitherto de-
bated, as discussed in the previous section. Given that we will study
news sharing in the context of Facebook and Twitter, our first hy-
pothesis is: [H1] Individual’s news sharing in social media is not
balanced but suffers from partisan sharing.
Partisan sharing changes across individuals. It has been found
that those who have a settled tendency of reading about politics
tend to seek out news confirming their political proclivities, mainly
because they do not like to pay attention to information challeng-
ing their views [36]. It is thus the case that ideological selectivity
is predominant among partisan people and news junkies [4, 36].
Thus, our next hypothesis is: [H2] An individual’s level of partisan
sharing depends on: [H2.1] political leaning; and [H2.2] amount
of political news shared. Those three factors are listed, for con-
venience, in the block on the left in Figure 1. That block collates
factors associated with partisan sharing, which also include time,
discussed next.
Partisan sharing changes over time. People tend to pay more
attention to politics during specific periods of time, for example,
during elections when the attention to the political agenda is high.
More generally we might hypothesize that [H3] Partisan sharing
1In this work, we only consider what people initially post (referred
as ‘share’) on social media.
is highly prevalent in politically salient periods.
Partisan sharing changes depending on the perceived impor-
tance of certain topic. People have their own preferences of which
issues are important and ought to be in the political agenda. These
preferences are often formed based on consumption of information
from politically-biased outlets. Different outlets are associated with
different topical priorities [22, 38]. Consequently, we hypothesize
that [H4]. Partisan sharing is associated with one’s perceived im-
portance of certain topic.
Consequence of partisan sharing. After having formulated hy-
potheses regarding the dynamics associated with partisan sharing,
we now formulate three hypotheses regarding its societal conse-
quences. Recent research has found that selective exposure results
into polarization and societal fragmentation [36, 37]. Our next hy-
pothesis is then [H5]. Partisan sharing is related to polarized po-
litical attitudes and, as such, affects one’s:
[H5.1] Perceived political bias of news outlets. Partisanship
often influences perceptions, including perception of how bi-
ased a news outlet is. It has been shown that the same outlet is
considered very differently by people depending on their po-
litical leanings [36]. A left-leaning outlet is perceived mod-
erately (if not at all) biased by left-leaning people, while it is
perceived highly biased by right-leaning people.
[H5.2] Political knowledge. Partisanship is associated with
political knowledge: the more partisan, the more knowledge-
able about politics [36].
[H5.3] Voting probability. When people decide for whom to
vote, they again rely on partisan media, which exert consid-
erable influence [26, 42].
Having a list of factors and of consequences associated with par-
tisan sharing, we are now ready to test their importance and we
do so by using two datasets: Facebook and Twitter datasets. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the hypotheses and report which dataset is used
to test which hypothesis. We mainly use Facebook data for the
analysis, and we validate and complement results with Twitter data
(Section 6).
4. METHODOLOGY
To begin with, we perform the following steps: gather a Facebook
dataset of news sharing, consider only articles about politics, de-
termine the media slant of the corresponding outlets, and compute
each user’s partisan skew. The higher an individual’s partisan skew
score, the higher his/her partisan sharing.
Facebook news sharing. More than five million Facebook users
have been able to take a variety of genuine personality and ability
tests by installing an application called myPersonality.2 Users can
also opt in and give their consent to share their personality scores
and profile information, and 40% have chosen to do so. We gather
news sharing information from a random subset of those users:
228,064 Facebook users who shared (i.e., posted) 4.9M links.
To avoid temporal biases generated by the adoption of the Face-
book application, we focus on a specific period of time that is sta-
ble enough: from April to September 2010. During that period, we
gathered 44,999 articles posted by 12,495 users: 37% of links are
successfully classified as political news articles through Alchemy
2http://www.mypersonality.org/wiki
Facebook
Liberal Conservative
huffingtonpost 11,236 (45.2%) foxnews 3,774 (51.5%)
nytimes 10,083 (41.3%) online.wsj 2,767 (54.1%)
msnbc.msn 4,892 (30.7%) nydailynews 1,433 (26.8%)
abcnews.go 2,752 (23.2%) nypost 695 (31.9%)
washingtonpost 2,468 (58.3%) politico 670 (87.3%)
time 2,104 (34.9%) forbes 565 (20.7%)
cbsnews 1,868 (22.8%) washingtontimes 432 (73.4%)
bostonglobe 1,260 (29.3%) townhall 426 (91.3%)
latimes 1,239 (37.3%) nationalreview 288 (65.9%)
salon 967 (64.8%) chicagotribune 239 (36.4%)
slate 923 (44.9%) bostonherald 118 (50.1%)
sfgate 779 (34.1%) usnews 130 (36.2%)
wnd 441 (72.1%) newsmax 93 (76.6%)
newyorker 368 (33.9%) weeklystandard 60 (79.5%)
Table 2: List of the News Sites Shared by Facebook Users. We
remove “.com” from domain name of news sites. Each outlet
comes with its total number and proportion of political news
articles.
API (discussed shortly). The articles they post come from 37 news
sites (a few representative news sites are displayed in Table 2.3).
The demographic of these users reflects the general Facebook pop-
ulation in USA 4: their number of social contacts is between 30
and 1000 and whose age is comprised between 18 and 54. This
group is composed of 7,372 women (59%) and 5,037 men (41%)
with a median age of 23. Table 3 reports the demographic details
of Facebook users in our dataset.
Each user has posted 2.85 articles on average; while 66.5% of
users have posted only one article. Based on their activity level
(i.e., number of news shared), we find 4,710 users who posted more
than two news articles, 2,113 users who posted more than four news
articles, and 950 users who posted more than eight news articles
on Facebook. We confirm that demographic information of those
groups are consistent with that of general Facebook population.
Only news articles about politics. To select only the articles about
politics, we need to be able to classify articles into categories, and
select those that fall into politics. To that end, we use Alchemy
text classification API.5 We use this API because it has been shown
that it entails superior classification performance compared to other
popular classifiers [33]. Alchemy API is a suite of natural language
processing tools. It is capable of assigning a plain English category
to any given string of text (a tweet, for instance), along with a cer-
tainty score from 0.0 to 1.0, which represents the API’s degree of
belief that the text pertains to that category. It can also take a URL
as an argument – it then classifies the textual content of the docu-
ment it finds there. Alchemy can choose from the following 12 top-
ics: Arts Entertainment, Business, Computer Internet, Culture Pol-
itics, Gaming, Health, Law Crime, Recreation, Religion, Science
Technology, Sports, and Weather. Hence we are using Alchemy
topics as a gold standard in our work. We excluded 5,705 URLs
36 news outlets are considered to be at the center of the political
spectrum: CNN (13,753 (39.7%)), NewsWeek (1,101 (45.8%)),
Arizona Central (363 (37.2%)), The Atlantic (384 (44.2%)), PBS
(808 (51.2%)), and Christian Science Monitor (603 (31.2%))
4Ugander et al. have reported that the age of 140M USA Facebook
users ranges from 13 to 60+ where 20s and 30s are the dominant.
Also the median number of social contacts is 100, yet, the distribu-
tion is highly skewed (there are few people having more than 1000
social contacts), resulting in 190 as an average value [40].
5http://www.alchemyapi.com
Facebook
Age <20(25%), <30(31%), <40(18%), ≥40(16%)
Gender Male (41%), Female (59%)
Partisanship Partisan (59.6% (Lib (69.9%),Con (30.1%))),
Non-partisan (40.4%)
Table 3: Details for our 12,855 Facebook Users.
that are categorized as “None” (e.g., broken link) and URLs that
have low confidence values (< 0.5 on Alchemy’s scale of [0, 1]).
Then we take the remaining ones that are classified under “Cul-
ture/Politics” for our analysis (16,729 news articles).
Determining media slant. We need to classify news outlets into
liberal, conservative, or center. Since the outlets in the Facebook
dataset are mainly in US (Table 2), we consider four classifica-
tion schemes previously used in the literature of political science:
1) Left-Right, which classifies a large number of news outlets, in-
cluding those with online presence only6; 2) MondoTimes, which
classifies news outlets based on user votes on a crowdsourcing plat-
form7 (this has been used in Gentzkow and Shapiro’s work [12]); 3)
Gentzkow and Shapiro’s novel classification, which relies on term
similarity between political speeches and news articles [12]; and
4) Larcinese et al.’s classification, which relies on the amount of
coverage media outlets give to U.S. political scandals [20]. The
results reported later on do not change depending on which of the
four classification we use. That is largely because the four schemes
show high agreement, as we shall discuss in Section 8. Thus we
report the results only for the first classification.
Measuring partisanship: Net partisan skew. To measure partisan
sharing, in line with previous work [19], we focus on news posting
from partisan sources (i.e., those that are classified as either con-
servative or liberal) and compute the net partisan skew as the num-
ber of conservative news postings minus that of liberal news (news
counts, being skewed, undergo a logarithm transformation):
leaningScoreconservative − leaningScoreliberal (1)
leaningScorep = ln(#news articles of p) (2)
leaningScorep is 0 when the news count of p is 0. The partisan
skew is our main measure of partisan sharing and reflects how bal-
anced a user’s news sharing is – for example, it is zero if the user
posts an equal amount of conservative and liberal news; it is± 1 if,
for every 2.7 (≈ e1) conservative (liberal) articles, the user posts 1
liberal (conservative) article; and it is ± 2 if, for every 7.4 (≈ e2)
conservative (liberal) articles, the user posts 1 liberal (conservative)
article. We use this metric to be able to compare our result to that of
previous work [19], which has incidentally shown limited evidence
of selective exposure.
5. PARTISAN SHARING IN FACEBOOK
We will test to which extent partisan sharing exists (Section 5.1)
and how it changes across individuals (Section 5.2) and over time
(Section 5.3), we will then study its association with perceived im-
portance of topics (Section 5.4). Table 1 reports which hypotheses
has been tested upon Facebook dataset.
6http://left-right.us
7http://mondotimes.com
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Figure 2: Net Partisan Skew of political news by (a) Activity Level. For any of the two activity levels (4+ articles and 8+ articles posted),
there are two peaks reflecting liberal views (left peak) and conservative views (smaller right peak), respectively. The majority of our
Facebook users are liberal. (b) Party. We consider users who share 4+ political articles. Liberal users share more liberal news outlets
and are centered around a net partisan skew of -1.8, while conservative users share more conservative news and are centered around
1.4. Net Partisan Skew of soft news (e.g., Arts Entertainment) by (c) Activity Level. For any of the two activity levels (4+ articles and
8+ articles posted), the distribution is unimodal and centered around -1.7 and -2.43, respectively. Both Liberal and Conservative are
sharing soft news coming from liberal outlets. (d) Party. We consider users who share 4+ political articles. Liberal users post more
liberal news outlets and are thus centered around a net partisan skew of -1.8.
5.1 Existence
[H1] Individuals’ news sharing in social media is not balanced but
suffers from partisan sharing.
To measure the extent to which partisan sharing exists, we an-
alyze news sharing for articles coming from partisan news outlets
– that is, from outlets that can be labeled as either conservative or
liberal. We compute net partisan skew using expression (1) (how
balanced one’s news sharing is): a positive score represents users
sharing news from conservative outlets, while a negative one indi-
cates sharing from liberal outlets. The theory of partisan sharing
suggests that we should find a binomial distribution, with conser-
vative users sharing predominantly conservative news articles, and
liberal users sharing predominantly liberal ones. Figure 2(a) dis-
plays the distribution of net partisan skew in the form of kernel den-
sity estimates for two sets of users – low-activity users who posted
at least 4 articles and high-activity ones who posted more than 8
articles. Each curve shows two peaks, reflecting two user segments
– one sharing exclusively liberal news, and the other sharing exclu-
sively conservative news. This is true for both curves, suggesting
that partisan sharing holds not only for high-activity users but also
for low-activity ones. Based on self-reported political affiliations,
clearly denoted as either “liberal” or “conservative”, on Facebook,
we separate liberal users (N = 149) from conservative ones (N=84)
and compute their partisan skew (Figure 2(b)). We find that all of
them share a considerable number of like-minded news and sys-
tematically avoid counter-attitudinal news. The majority of liberals
(conservatives) read one counter-attitudinal article every 6 (4) like-
minded articles.
Finally, since it has been shown that selective exposure to po-
litical news ends up influencing news sharing on matters that are
not strictly related to politics [36], we analyze sharing of not only
political news but of any type of news. We find that, when shar-
ing news about, say, Arts Entertainment, people do not constraint
their general (non-political) news sharing to outlets matching their
political beliefs, resulting in a unimodal (skewed to the left) dis-
tribution (Figure 2(c)). Surprisingly, conservatives tend to share
non-political news from liberal outlets (Figure 2(d)).
5.2 Changes across individuals
Despite the evidence that partisan sharing occurs, it is clear that
not everyone shares like-minded news to the same extent – after
all, 32.8% of users have a net partisan skew in the range as low as
[-1,1]. Does partisan sharing change depending on users’ charac-
teristics? Previous studies in political science have posited that an
individual’s level of partisan sharing depends on: [H2.1] political
leaning; and [H2.2] amount of news sharing.
We test whether partisan sharing changes depending on one’s po-
litical leaning (H2.1). For a fair comparison, we first check whether
the activity level of liberals and conservative are comparable. We
find that they are similar – on average liberals share 9 news articles,
while it is 8.2 news articles shared for conservative. Also unpaired
t-test confirms that there is no difference on their activity level (the
hypotheses was rejected). Then, we plot the (absolute value) of
partisan skew for conservative and liberals (Figure 3(a)). By run-
ning unpaired t-test on these values, we find that liberals tend to
be more partisan (with net skew of 1.82) than conservative (with
net skew of 1.26) (t(166.535) = 5.805, p < 0.0005). For every
counter-attitudinal news article shared, liberals will also share 6.2
like-minded articles, while conservative will only share 3.5 like-
minded articles. This means that conservative users are less polar-
ized than liberal ones, sharing 43% less like-minded articles. This
is in line with work by LaCour who found that “Democrats, as a
group, watch slightly more like-minded news, while on average
Republicans have a more balanced media diet” [19].
Next, to test H2.2, we plot the net partisan skew (absolute value)
against news sharing (i.e., the logarithm of number of shared news
articles) in Figure 3(b). The higher the news sharing, the higher
the partisan skew. For example, users who shared 4 articles (≈
1.2 on the x-axis) have an average partisan skew of 1.2: for ev-
ery 3.3 (≈ e1.2) conservative (liberal) articles, those users share
1 liberal (conservative) article. Higher-level activity users, say,
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Figure 3: Net Partisan Skew by (a) Party and (b) Activity. The
absolute value of partisan skew is for US Facebook users who
have shared 4+ articles.
those who shared 20 articles (≈ 3 on the x-axis) have partisan
skew of 2: for every 7.4 (≈ e2) like-minded articles, those users
share only 1 counter-attitudinal article. As users share more news,
they also share more partisan news. For statistical test, we run
two popular correlation with a Pearson’s correlation coefficients
of r = .41 (p <0.0005) and with a Spearman’s correlation co-
efficients of r = .46 (p <0.0005). This finding runs contrary to
what recent work has found [19] and confirms the partisan sharing
hypothesis: as news sharing increases, readers tune out the other
side.
5.3 Changes over time
From February to September 2010, primary elections were held in
the USA (elections in which each political party nominates candi-
dates for an upcoming general election), and different States held
them in different months (e.g., Indiana in May, California in June).8
We consider the time window in which our Facebook data overlaps
with the election period and obtain news sharing data for two sets –
States that voted in May (10 states out of 10 that held elections) and
those that voted in June (12 out of 13). We then test the following
hypothesis:
[H3] Partisan sharing is prevalent in politically salient periods
(e.g., during elections).
Figure 4 shows the average partisan skew (absolute value) for the
two sets – for both of them, partisanship is minimum in the election
month and tends to increase to a stable point outside that period.
For the States voting in May, the absolute average partisan skew is
1.4 in the election month and is around 1.6 outside it. This means
that, during elections, for every 4 (≈ e1.4) conservative (liberal) ar-
ticles, users post 1 liberal (conservative) article. Outside elections,
partisan skew increases: users need to post 5 (≈ e1.6) conservative
(liberal) articles to then post 1 liberal (conservative) article. The
same pattern holds for the States voting in June, where the ratios
are 3.3-to-1 during elections and 4-to-1 outside them. Contrary to
our expectation, this result (i.e., minimum partisanship during elec-
tions) seems to suggest that Facebook users tend to make their news
diets both richer and more balanced during elections. Or it might
well be that partisans share news articles from hostile outlets, just
to make fun of them. If we were to have comments associated with
the act of sharing, we would have studied their sentiment. Unfor-
tunately, we do not have such data. However, we should stress that
temporal evolution of partisanship has never been studied before,
and this result, albeit preliminary, suggests that it is a research di-
rection that ought to be in the agenda.
8http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us+canada-10634453
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Figure 4: Absolute Net Partisan Skew by voting US states. That
had primary elections in May (first barplot), and those in June
(second barplot).
5.4 Changes depending on perceived impor-
tance
[H4] Partisan sharing is associated with one’s perceived impor-
tance of certain topic.
To test H4, i.e., whether media news supply is tailored to partisan
consumption (e.g., whether Fox News tailors its offering to its parti-
san readers as opposed to moderate ones), we identify two different
classes of users – those who are partisan (high net skew) and those
who are moderate (low net skew) – and see whether they consume
different topics to a different extent. To do so, we match (moder-
ate and partisan) conservative users with conservative outlets, and
(moderate and partisan) liberal ones with liberal outlets. We then
compute the total supply-demand divergence for four subgroups of
the form user&outlet: partisan&conservatives, moderate& conser-
vatives, partisan&liberals, and moderate&liberals. The divergence
for any of the four sets is then:
divergence =
∑
topic
|demandtopic − supplytopic| (3)
computed over all topics covered by Alchemy API (Section 4),
demandtopic is the proportion of news articles a certain type of users
(e.g., moderate) have consumed in that topic, and supplytopic is the
proportion of news articles the partisan media have supplied for
that topic. If an outlet supplies articles consumed by a certain class
of users (e.g., partisan vs. moderate), then the divergence is zero
for that class. By contrast, it is highest when the supplied articles
do not meet the demand of that class of users at all. We expect
that supply matches the partisans’ news demand (lower divergence)
rather than the moderates’ (higher divergence). News outlets tend
to meet the demand of partisan users twice as much as (1.7 x) the
demand of moderate ones.
5.5 Summary
We have found that partisan sharing: 1) exists, but contrary to the
literature, such selectivity is limited to political news; 2) changes
across individuals – people who are interested in politics tend to
have stronger partisanship; 3) changes over time, in particular, their
political diversity increases during the election period; and 4) is as-
sociated with perceived importance of topic – news outlets match
the information needs of partisan rather than moderate online read-
ers.
Figure 5: Screenshot of our application.
6. PARTISAN SHARING IN TWITTER
We first analyzed a Facebook dataset of shared news articles. Since
we can test only part of the hypotheses on Facebook data, we also
build a political engagement site connected to Twitter to perform
the remaining hypotheses. As shown in Table 1, we validate the
first three hypotheses and we newly investigate the last three hy-
potheses with a Twitter dataset.
6.1 Methodology
To conduct the study, we follow steps similar to those described in
Section 4: gather a Twitter dataset, extract political news articles,
determine media slant, and measure net partisan skew of each user.
Twitter news sharing of BBC audience. Question Time is a top-
ical debate television program in UK. The show typically features
five panelists – three UK politicians from the major parties plus
two public figures – who answer pre-selected questions. On 24
September 2009, the show launched its Twitter presence and, by
June 2011, it became one of the most-tweeted shows in the UK,
with more than 5K tweets using the #bbcqt hashtag during each
week. We have implemented a web application9 with which BBC
viewers could select the panelist they found more convincing (see
Figure 5). These viewers were recruited by posting messages on the
Twitter stream of #bbcqt hashtag. We made the application avail-
able during three weekly programs in 2012 (Oct 24, Nov 1, and
Nov 7). During this period, we had 102 users who voted, among
whom 71 reported their Twitter usernames and 35 answered survey
questions (e.g., which party is closest to your political preference?,
how politically biased are the following news outlets? did you vote
in the last general election?). Table 4 reports details of those user
who responded. For the 71 users who reported their valid user-
names, we crawled their tweets. We gathered 1,008 political news
articles posted by the 71 users for the last 5 months of data col-
lection, which happened to come from 10 different UK news sites
reported in Table 2.10 The average number of articles per individual
is 14 and the median is 10.
Determining media slant. In the Twitter dataset, we have mainly
UK outlets, for which the literature does not offer any classifica-
tion. We thus contacted three UK political journalists and ask them
to classify the outlets into liberal, conservative, or neutral for us
(Table 5). We measure the inter-rater agreement using Cohen’s
kappa coefficient [5], which results in 1 if two raters are in com-
9http://www.votingtime.org.uk
10BBC News (375 (48%)) was one of the popular news sources
among our users, and it is known to be neutral.
Twitter
Age <20 (8%), <30 (7%), <40 (33%), <50 (22%), ≥ 50 (30%)
Gender Male (65%), Female (35%)
Partisanship Partisan (81.2% (Labour (40%), Lib(17%),
Ind (31%), Con (12%))), Non-partisan (18.8%)
Table 4: Details for our 35 Twitter Users interviewed.
Twitter
Liberal Conservative
guardian 482 (40.6%) telegraph 350 (45.7%)
independent 141 (37.4%) dailymail 149 (31.9%)
mirror 67 (34.1%) thesun 64(36.4%)
Table 5: List of the News Sites Shared by Twitter Users. We
remove “.co.uk” from domain name of news sites.
plete agreement. The overall kappa score among them on the 10
UK news sites was as high as 0.918. Under majority rule, we take
a political leaning for a media source that is preferred by a majority
of journalists.
6.2 Validation
The goal of building this platform and integrating it with Twitter is
to test whether partisan sharing has any read-world impact. Before
meeting this goal, we need to verify whether the hypotheses that
hold on Facebook also hold on Twitter. From the Twitter data, we
are able to verify the first two sets of hypotheses (i.e., H1 and H2).
Existence.
[H1] Individuals’ news sharing in social media is not balanced but
suffers from partisan sharing.
To test [H1], we plot the distribution of net partisan skew of
Twitter users. There is no bimodal distribution as in the case of
Facebook (Figure 6(a)). There are two possible explanations: 1)
Twitter itself is known to predominantly liberal [30]; or 2) con-
servative users in Twitter share also liberal articles. However, if we
consider only partisan users, the bimodal distribution (reflecting the
existence of partisan sharing) is back in the picture (Figure 6(b)).
Changes across individuals.
An individual’s level of partisan sharing depends on: [H2.1] polit-
ical leaning and [H2.2] amount of news shared.
First, to test [H2.1], we compare absolute net partisan skew of
liberal users to that of conservative users (Figure 7(a)). The re-
sult confirms our previous observation: liberals tend to be more
partisan (with net skew of 1.5). When we examine how abso-
lute net partisan skew varies by amount of political news shared
([H2.2]), we find a positive correlation between these two variables
(Figure 7(b)) with a Pearson’s correlation coefficients of r = .31
(p < 0.005) and with a Spearman’s correlation coefficients of of
r = .30 (p < 0.01), indicating that those who share more are the
ones with stronger partisanship.
6.3 Additional hypotheses
Having ascertained the existence of partisan sharing also on Twit-
ter, we now determine whether it is associated with one’s polarized
political attitude by administering a survey to the participants of
our TV experiment.
[H5] Partisan sharing will relate to polarized political attitudes and,
as such, affects one’s:
[H5.1] perceived political bias of news outlets;
[H5.2] political knowledge;
[H5.3] voting probability.
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Figure 6: Net Partisan Skew of political news in Twitter: (a) The majority of our Twitter users are liberal; (b) Liberals and con-
servatives share like-minded news; (c) Both share soft news from outlets of no particular leaning (peak is centered around -0.5); (d)
Partisanship for soft news.
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Figure 7: Net Partisan Skew by (a) Party and (b) Activity. The
absolute value of partisan skew is for UK Twitter users who
have shared 4+ articles.
To test the relationship between perceived bias and partisanship
(H5.1), we ask our application survey’s respondents to which ex-
tent they thought four news outlets – BBC, Telegraph, Guardian,
and The Sun – were politically biased (the score ranges from 0 to
100, where 0 means ‘neutral’ and 100 means ‘strongly biased’).
We then compare perceived bias by users with different political
leanings. We find that liberal and conservative users significantly
differ in their perceptions of the media’s leanings (Figure 8). For
example, liberals perceive the Guardian to be far less biased (56 on
a [0,100] scale) than conservatives do (93). People need to objec-
tively recognize biased reporting to discount it. The problem is that
they are not able to do so: they scrutinize hostile news outlets (those
holding views different to their own), while they turn a blind (cog-
nitive) eye to “friendly” news outlets. The ominous consequence
of all this is that like-minded information is often perceived to be
unbiased and is thus accepted with little scrutiny.
To test the relationship between political knowledge and parti-
san sharing (H5.2), we need to test one’s knowledge. The users
of our application administer to a survey. The survey contains 11
questions, 4 of which form together a small political knowledge
quiz about general UK political facts: Which position is now held
by George Osborne? Is the Queen above the law? When does the
House of Commons scrutinise the government? Which party has
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Figure 8: Perceived Bias of News Outlets by Party.
the most members in the House of Commons? 35 Twitter users
answered the survey and the quiz. Given the low number of peo-
ple, the results need to be taken with caution, but we will see that
they confirm previous evidence about news consumption offline,
and that deviations from average (error bars) are limited.
We anticipate that political knowledge (number of correct an-
swers) would be related to partisan sharing. That is because Stroud
anticipated that “partisan selective exposure enhances political knowl-
edge” [36]. The results of net partisan skew against number of
correct answers in the quiz are shown in Figure 9(a). As expected,
the politically knowledgeable tended to be more partisan than those
less knowledgeable.
Finally, to test the relationship between voting probability and
partisan sharing (H5.3), we contrast two types of Twitter users –
those who have declared to have reached a decision about whether
they will vote at the next UK general election in our survey, and
those who remain undecided. In line with previous findings in
USA [36], UK people who have decided whether to vote are also
more partisan than those who remain undecided (t(4.558) = 4.566,
p < 0.01). Despite the small Twitter sample size, the difference is
enough not to leave any room for alternative interpretations.
Having their decisions about whether they will vote at the next
UK general election, we run a linear regression that predicts one’s
partisanship based on voting probability:
|netpartisanskew| = α+ β1votingGeneralElection
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Figure 9: Net Partisan Skew by (a) Political Knowledge and
(b) Probability of Voting. The absolute value of partisan skew
is for UK Twitter users who have shared 4+ articles.
The regression has an adjusted R2 of 0.49 and the beta coefficient
of votingGeneralElection is 0.98 (p < 0.005). This result indicates that
individual’s partisanship could be predicted only by whether they
have decided to vote or not.
6.4 Summary
After having ascertained the existence of partisan sharing, we stud-
ied the real-world impact of it. As one expects, it is negative as it is
strongly related to distorted perceptions of which news outlets are
politically biased and which not. However, it is also positive: it is
associated with people who are knowledgeable about politics and
are actively engaged in political life.
7. PREDICTING PARTISANSHIP
Not everyone values diversity [24]. Thus, to build tools that counter
partisan sharing, one would need to identify partisan users first, so
that they can adopt a personalized strategy. Several studies have
attempted to predict the political leanings of users in SNSs, partic-
ularly by their social networks [35] and by the usage of political
hashtag in Twitter [6]. Unlike previous work, we attempt to predict
a level of partisanship with our Facebook and Twitter datasets.
7.1 A case study of Facebook
Since we have rich demographic data for our Facebook users, we
will try to predict their levels of partisanship. More specifically, we
consider. The following predictors:
• Three Facebook variables: number of Facebook friends, num-
ber of postings, and number of likes received from their so-
cial contacts.
• Three personal attributes: sex, age, and size of the city s(he)
lives in.
• Five personality traits: for our users, we have data from the
five-factor model of personality, or the big five, which is the
most comprehensive, reliable and useful set of personality
concepts [8, 15]. An individual is associated with five scores
that correspond to the five main personality traits and that
form the acronym of OCEAN. Imaginative, spontaneous, and
adventurous individuals are high in Openness. Individu-
als who are ambitious, resourceful and persistent individuals
are high in Conscientiousness. Individuals who are socia-
ble and tend to seek excitement are high in Extraversion.
Those high inAgreeableness are trusting, altruistic, tender-
minded, and are motivated to maintain positive relationships
with others. Finally, emotionally liable and impulsive indi-
viduals are high in Neuroticism.
All predictors undergo a logarithmic transformation, when nec-
essary (e.g., when they are skewed) and are then correlate with
net partisan skew. We find that conservatives (high in net partisan
skew) tend to be older (r = 0.24), have less likes from friends (r =
−0.13), live in smaller town than liberals (r = −0.15), are more
emotionally stable and less spontaneous than liberals (rOpenness =
−0.20, rConscientiousness = −0.15, and rNeuroticism = −0.21) All co-
efficients are statistically significant at level p < 0.005. Next, we
study how these predictors are correlated with partisanship. To this
end, we correlate them with the absolute value of net partisan skew
- the higher his/her absolute value, the more partisan a user. Out
of the eleven predictors, none of them was correlated for conser-
vatives, while only sex was correlated for liberals (r = 0.30),
suggesting that liberal men tend to be more partisan than liberal
women. To sum up, it turns out that predicting political leaning (the
area which most existing research in computer science has gone
into) is far easier than predicting partisanship, which appears to be
quite challenging. As a result, it might be very difficult to create
tools that effectively counter partisan sharing without being able to
identify partisan users.
7.2 A case study of Twitter
The relationship between partisanship and perceived bias also sug-
gests an interesting practical application: knowing how an individ-
ual perceives four news outlets to be biased, one could potentially
predict the individual’s political leaning. To test this, we ask our
application survey’s respondents to report their partisanship on a
scale [0,100], where 0 is Labour, 25 is Liberal, 75 is conservative,
and 100 is British National Party (BNP) or UK Independence Party
(UKIP).11
Having their views on how they perceived the four outlets to be
biased, we run a linear regression that predicts one’s partisanship
based on perceived biases12:
partisanship = α+ β1biasBBC + β2biasTelegraph+
β3biasGuardian + β4biasTheSun
The regression has an adjusted R2 of 0.44, which means that as
much as 44% of the variability of an individual’s partisanship is
explained only by how the individual perceives four news outlets
to be biased. The strongest beta coefficients are registered for the
left-leaning The Guardian ( biasGuardian = 0.62) and right-leaning
The Sun (biasTheSun=-0.61). The different signs suggest that what
differentiates conservatives from liberals is how they perceive The
Guardian and The Sun: the two groups will perceive biased (re-
liable) a different news outlet. The best way to quickly assess
whether one is conservative or not would be to ask him/her how bi-
ased The Guardian is and how reliable The Sun is. Indeed, knowing
the perceived biases for these two outlets, one could predict parti-
sanship with an adjusted R2 of 0.41. The remaining coefficients
are of less importance: biasTelegraph=-0.17 (right-leaning newspa-
per considered biased by left-leaning people); and biasBBC= 0.11
(neutral news media corporation considered biased by right-leaning
people). All coefficients are statistically significant at level p <
0.01.
11BNP is far-right political party and UKIP is known to right-wing
populist political party in UK.
12Given that Twitter users were recruited through web application,
connectivity among them was very low (a probability a user is fol-
lowing another was 4%), allowing us to apply a linear regression
model.
Figure 10: Attention Dynamics.
8. DISCUSSION
Validating media slant. To categorize news outlets, we have used
four measures of media slant. Had only one been used, we might
have been unsure whether our results hold true in general, or whether
they are the product of classification artifacts. The four measures
are: scheme1: http://left-right.org ; scheme2: crowd-
sourcing platform http://mondotime.com; scheme3: classi-
fication based on scandals [20] ; and scheme4: classification based
on congressmen’s speeches [12]. All the results we have presented
hold for all the four scheme. That is largely because, for any pair
of schemes, the two tend to be in agreement. To show this, we
consider all possible unordered scheme pairs, and compute their
agreement. By agreement, we mean the number of concordant clas-
sifications of the two schemes divided by the total number of clas-
sifications. Table 6 shows that agreement scores are above 80%,
suggesting that the four schemes are all likely to return very simi-
lar classification of media slant.
Agreement scheme1 scheme2 scheme3 scheme1
scheme1 100 93.67 81.48 100
scheme2 93.67 100 81.48 95.83
scheme3 81.48 81.48 100 100
scheme4 100 95.83 100 100
Table 6: Pairwise-Agreement of Media Slant Measures.
Being exposed does not necessarily translate into actions. Pre-
vious work that supports selective exposure has mostly measured
news consumption from self-reported survey data. The little work
that has gone into the direct and unobtrusive measurement of news
consumption has conflated active with passive exposure. By ac-
tive exposure, we refer to a situation in which one is either paying
attention to news to which (s)he is exposed and, eventually, is trans-
lating that attention into action (e.g., calling a friend to chat about
the latest political scandal) or is able to recall (e.g., telling an inter-
viewer about the latest political scandal one has read). Instead, by
passive exposure, we refer to a situation in which one is exposed to
news (s)he is not paying attention to (because, e.g., (s)he is multi-
tasking). In this work, we have measured how people act upon
a piece of news by analyzing what Facebook users actually share
with their social contacts. Our results are in line with those pro-
duced upon self-reported data [36] and are in contrast with studies
of direct measurements [13, 19]. One possible explanation is that
direct measurements capture exposure to news but not necessarily
attention (Figure 10) – one might be exposed to a piece of news
without paying attention to it. By contrast, telling to have read a
piece of news or posting it on Facebook can only happen if one has
paid attention to the piece of news in the first place. By studying
news sharing, we have moved the literature forward by measuring
active (as opposed to passive) exposure and found evidence for par-
tisan sharing.
Limitations. This work has some main limitations. First, our Twit-
ter and Facebook users represent a specific subgroup. Our Twitter
users are individuals who are definitely interested in politics as they
watch Question Time and tweet about it. Since cultural guidelines
clearly exist about political behavior and attitude, one should best
consider that our results are likely to hold for that specific group of
Twitter users. Similarly, we do not attempt to generalize our Face-
book results – they apply to Facebook users who live in the United
States. Secondly, the sample size of Twitter users is limited. As
such, the results should only be considered to be preliminary. Yet,
they seem to be reasonable for two main reasons: 1) error bars al-
low us to distinguish which results are more definite than others;
2) results on Twitter and Facebook are consistent, and that speaks
to their external validity: it is no coincidence that two different
platforms in two different countries show similar results. The third
limitation of our work is that we do not have any data on why a user
shares an article. If a user share a news article of an hostile media
outlet, it does not necessarily mean that (s)he is vouching for it –
(s)he might simply make fun of it. However, given the large sam-
ple size on Facebook, such an effect would be likely randomized.
The fourth limitation of our work is that the assumption that arti-
cles published by a news outlet matches the outlet’s political slant.
This is reasonable based on the literature of political science, which
suggests that even a factual article, as opposed to an op-ed (opinion-
editorial) article, often follows a political slant of its source. The
last limitation is that we could not test causality for our hypotheses
as we do not hold enough data.
Engaging undecided voters through social media. Social media
have been used by US political campaigners to engage the pub-
lic. Since past elections have been determined by independent
and undecided voters, “especially those women voters who decide
late” [10], it might be beneficial to identify the undecided, indif-
ferent, procrastinating, and nonparticipating voters. To do so, this
work has suggested that one could search for social media users
who have shared only a limited number of political news articles
before the election. That strategy would directly target undecided
voters. More sophisticated targeting strategies could tap into social
influence [34]. One could, for example, identify users who are both
partisan (with a simple computation of their net partisan skew) and
have a considerable number of social contacts who are undecided:
they are in the best (social networking) position to influence a large
fraction of undecided voters.
9. CONCLUSION
In large part, political views in the United States are formed nowa-
days by either television or the Internet. In the past, the structure
of television news was built around a broader electorate, and that
has changed with the introduction of cable TV: people crave like-
minded news channels and avoid politically hostile ones. Do online
habits keep up with television ones? This question is too important
to be left to the unknown, not least because of the recent decline of
national networks and newspapers and the rise of ever more online
social media in news industry. This is the first study to unobtru-
sively measure partisan sharing in the context of online news con-
sumption. We have shown that partisan sharing still exists and does
depend on a variety of factors. Consequently, in the near future, as
the current structure of online media consolidates, we might be left
with a political discourse driven by echo chambers. It is important,
then, to create alternative media that brings together left, right, and
center.
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